In his latest op-ed, columnist and fill-in host for Rush has a compelling case for a leaner military.

America is responsible for about 43% of the planet’s military expenditure. This is partly a reflection of the diminished military budgets of everyone else. As Britain and the other European powers learned very quickly in the decades after the Second World War, when it comes to a choice between unsustainable welfare programs or a military of global reach, the latter is always easier to cut.

It is, needless to say, a false choice. By mid-decade the Pentagon’s huge bloated budget will be less than the mere interest payments on U.S. debt, much of which goes to bankrolling the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Nevertheless, faced with reducing funding for China’s military or our own, the latter will be the easier choice for Washington.

So the assumptions of the last 60 years are over — and not just because of the cost. If America’s responsible for 43% of global military expenditure, why doesn’t it feel like that? Why does the United States get so little bang for the buck?

It is two-thirds of a century since this country won a war (and please don’t bother writing in to say what about Grenada or Panama).

In the days after 9/11, many Bush administration officials assured us this time it would be different, and even liberals believed them. A decade later, Washington can’t wait to get the hell out of the Hindu Kush, and the day after they do it will be as if they never set foot on that benighted sod.

Illiterate goat herders with string and fertilizer have tied down the hyperpower for twice as long as it took America to win the Second World War. Something is wrong with this picture.

The sad, inexcusable truth is that we have not decisively won a war since World War II. As Steyn points out, the Bush administration attempted to assure us that the War on Terror would be run much differently than Vietnam; it would be waged with a strategic but decisive use of force designed to achieve one singular, unambiguous goal: undeniable victory.

We have not seen a decisive use of force since October/November 2001 in Afghanistan and, as consequence, we have not attained unmistakable victory — that is if we have achieved victory at all.

Let me be clear: we have failed to win the wars of the last half century not because of our military servicemen and women or their capabilities, but because of four primary reasons:

1. Refusing, due to political correctness, to label our enemy just that — the enemy;
2. Unwillingness to use the requisite force to quickly and decisively defeat the enemy;
3. Too many MBA-types in high-level military leadership positions;
4. Cowardly and politically correct presidents civilian leaders.

What do I mean by too many MBA-types in our military leadership? I’m referring to those in high-ranking positions in the various branches of the military who believe that wars ought to be fought and managed like a corporation — that every decision and battlefield action must be analyzed through the lense of political correctness.

Cabinet departments, including the Defense Department, can and should, to some degree, be managed like a private sector enterprise. An approach that emphasizes not only increasing efficiency but also improving results and promoting visionary, innovative thinking.

Wars, however, cannot and must not be managed. When wars are managed we get results like Vietnam and the War on Terror post 2001. Wars must be fought — fiercely and swiftly.

A leaner military should not necessarily mean a weaker, smaller military force. A truly lean military force is one that is continuously improving, able to adapt to both conventional and unconventional threats, and can inflict maximum, lethal force through the use of a variety of weapons, technologies, and strategies.

This is precisely what the much-maligned former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld set out to accomplish prior to the Islamofascist attack’s of 9/11. Secretary Rumsfeld took the Defense post with the intention of transitioning the military away from focusing solely on 20th century threats like protracted ground wars to those of the 21st century like terrorism. This is not to say that we should not prepare for a surprise naval attack from China or a protracted ground war with Iran (these are just examples).

He is ridiculed ad nauseam for it, but Rumsfeld summed up war planning quite well with his “Known and Unknown” remarks:

I am in agreement with Rumsfeld and Mark Steyn. To quote Steyn, “I am in favor of a leaner, meaner military — emphasis on both adjectives.”